The European Commission adopted its annual Enlargement Package, providing a detailed assessment of the state of play and the progress made by Georgia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Türkiye.
As the report reads, “Georgia is moderately prepared in this area. No progress was made in the reporting period.
The recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Georgia should in particular:
* considerably increase its alignment with the CFSP (statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on sanctions) and avoid unilateral statements and actions that run contrary to EU positions on foreign policy;
* continue to ensure that the territory of Georgia and/or legal entities registered in Georgia are not used to circumvent EU sanctions, particularly in relation to Russia and Belarus;
* consider participating in EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy.”
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS / PRIORITIES
Step 1: Fight disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference against the EU and its values.
In December 2023, the Government adopted a communication strategy for 2024-2027 and a linked action plan in May 2024, focusing on the fight against anti-Western disinformation and propaganda, enhancing media literacy, detecting and monitoring disinformation and upgrading the strategic communication system. The Stratcom and Information Centre on NATO-EU under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has conducted information campaigns and various awarenessraising activities nationwide. Local think tanks, NGOs, fact-checkers and investigative outlets have expressed readiness to collaborate with State institutions, but there has been no dialogue nor coordination in this area. During the reporting period, manipulation of EU-related information has been increasing. In particular since the re-introduction of the draft law on transparency of foreign influence in April 2024, harsh anti-EU messages, actively spread by high level ruling party officials and MPs, have become recurrent. In the run-up to Parliamentary elections, disinformation narratives have been disseminated and amplified by i.a. ruling party officials and government-affiliated media.
Step 2: Improve Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
In the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), by the end of the reporting period, Georgia’s alignment rate with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions was persistently low at 49%. Georgia did not join most restrictive measures relating to Russia, Iran and Belarus and further increased direct flights to various destinations in Russia. It continued to cooperate with the EU on prevention of sanctions circumvention, while passing new legislation allowing the tax-free transfer of offshore funds to Georgia. During the reporting period, Georgia continued to align itself with international and EU initiatives in support of Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, the Council of Europe and the OSCE.
Step 3: Further address the issue of political polarisation, including through more inclusive legislative work with opposition parties in Parliament, notably on legislation related to Georgia’s European integration.
The level of political polarisation further deepened, particularly in the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections and in the wake of the adoption of the Law on transparency of foreign 22 influence. Cross-party cooperation on EU integration-related reforms was very limited as most of the relevant legislation was adopted and appointments were made without the opposition’s involvement. The Parliament did not ensure sufficient involvement of civil society in the legislative processes. Threats from leaders of the parliamentary majority towards opposition members and civil society representatives continued. During the protests around the law on transparency of foreign influence, several key figures of opposition parties and civil society representatives have been verbally intimidated and physically attacked. On 23 August, the ruling party announced its plan to ban most of the opposition parties in case of victory in the October’s parliamentary elections. Relations between the President and the Government have further deteriorated over the reporting period, with the President vetoing a series of laws she assessed contradictory to Georgia’s EU integration and filing a lawsuit at the Constitutional Court against the foreign influence law.
Step 4: Ensure a free, fair and competitive electoral process, notably in 2024, and fully address OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Finalise electoral reforms, including ensuring adequate representation of the electorate, well in advance of election day.
In February 2024, the Government invited a OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission. The Central Election Commission (CEC) led a large-scale information campaign about the use of electronic technologies, which are expected to cover 90% of voters and will be used in around 70% polling stations nationwide. In March, Parliament adopted amendments to the Election Code disregarding long-standing recommendations of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR. The amendments foresee the appointment of the CEC Chairperson and CEC non-party members by a simple majority of Parliament members and foresee no effective involvement of other institutions, including the President. In April, Parliament appointed the CEC Chair. Previous recommendations from joint Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR opinions have still not been fully addressed. These include the delimitation of electoral districts, changes to media campaign regulations and preventive measures against the intimidation of voters. Further amendements to the Electoral Code adopted in May 2024 without prior inclusive consultations with the opposition, abolished the CEC advisory group composed of representatives of the Public Defender and observer organisations. In the same month, Parliament voted to abolish gender quotas on electoral lists, which had been previously extended until 2032. On 16 August, the CEC adopted a resolution which mandates that the drawing of lots to distribute the functions of commission members at all types of polling stations must be conducted no later than the seventh day before voting, instead of on the day of voting. The preliminary findings of the joint international election observation mission led by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights identified several shortcomings that occurred in a tense and highly polarised environment. The reported weaknesses include i.a. the recent legislative amendments to the election process, frequent compromises on vote secrecy, procedural inconsistencies, intimidation and pressure on voters that negatively impacted public trust in the process. These preliminary findings confirm the need for a comprehensive electoral reform that was already highlighted in past key recommendations.
Step 5: Further improve the implementation of parliamentary oversight notably of the security services. Ensure institutional independence and impartiality of key institutions, notably the election administration, the National Bank and the Communications Commission.
Parliament initiated the process to fill the vacant opposition seat in the Parliamentary Trust Group in March 2024, but lengthy vetting procedures mean that the chosen person will effectively not be able to take up the position before the end of the legislative period. Another vacancy in the trust group appeared when the Chairman of the Parliament’s Defence and Security Committee was appointed as the Head of Intelligence Service of Georgia. Quality of oversight over security 23 services remained limited. Investigation into allegations of large-scale illegal wiretapping in 2021 has not, so far, led to any prosecutions. Electoral amendments adopted in March 2024 (see also Step 4) reduce the institutional independence of the Central Election Commission. No actions were undertaken to strengthen the independence of the National Bank and to ensure that all board members are appointed in a transparent and competitive manner. There have been no steps undertaken to appoint a governor since March 2023 and some board positions remain vacant. The amendments to the Law on broadcasting adopted by Parliament in November 2023, included provisions on selecting and terminating the tenure of Communications Commission (ComCom) members. In June 2024, the ComCom adopted secondary normative acts, including codes of conduct for on-demand audio-visual media services, guidelines on the definition of a small audience and standards for access to media services for persons with disabilities. Guidelines on hate speech are being finalised and selected elements of the audio-visual media services directives, such as on advertising, are not fully covered.
Step 6: Complete and implement a holistic and effective judicial reform, including a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office, fully implementing Venice Commission recommendations, and following a transparent and inclusive process.
In May 2024, Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Common Courts, which do not address systemic and substantial recommendations of the 2023 enlargement report and the Venice Commission for a comprehensive reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the Supreme Court including a system of extraordinary integrity checks. The law addresses one key recommendation of the Venice Commission on judges’ disciplinary liability and has several minor positive elements including on transparency and the gradual renewal of the composition of the HCJ. Amendments do not tackle judicial reform in a holistic and effective manner and no preparations were made for introducing a system of extraordinary integrity checks. A new Prosecutor-General was appointed with simple majority in July 2024, and the Tbilisi City Court suspended the decision of the President to appoint a new non-judge member to the HCJ, and prohibited to appoint new members for five months in July 2024. Moreover, in 2024, four Supreme Court judges were appointed by Parliament despite the fact that the legal framework concerning the selection process remains not fully in line with European standards. In 2023, limited amendments to the Law on the Prosecution Service addressed prosecutorial selfgovernance in the recruitment of prosecutors and the extension of the scope of the asset declaration regime to all prosecutors. The legal changes do not align the legislative framework with European standards including the appointment procedure of the Prosecutor General and internal independence and disciplinary proceedings of prosecutors.
Step 7: Further address the effectiveness and ensure the institutional independence and impartiality of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Special Investigative Service and the Personal Data Protection Service. Address Venice Commission recommendations related to these bodies, in an inclusive process. Establish a strong track record in investigating corruption and organised crime cases.
Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on the fight against corruption, strengthening the immunity of the Head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) and protection of whistle-blowers. However, the current institutional design of the ACB does not provide for a sufficient degree of independence, as the amendments did not address key Venice Commission recommendations related to the institution’s independence, its political neutrality and investigative functions on highlevel corruption cases. This has yet to be adequately addressed. Further efforts are also needed 24 to tackle high-level corruption and to address large-scale vested interests and their influence in both the political, judicial and economic spheres. No updated anti-corruption risk assessment, strategy and action plan were developed in the reporting period. Georgia has not re-joined the OECD anti-corruption monitoring network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (OECD/ACN). Parliament adopted amendments to the Laws on Special Investigation Service (SIS) and protection of personal data which take into account some Venice Commission recommendations including on selection process and investigative jurisdiction. Key concerns regarding the appointment and immunity of the heads of the services, exclusion of high-ranking officials, effectiveness of the investigations of the SIS and expanding the mandate linked to covert wiretapping remain outstanding.
Step 8: Improve the current action plan to implement a multi-sectorial, systemic approach to deoligarchisation, in line with Venice Commission recommendations and following a transparent and inclusive process involving opposition parties and civil society.
Parliament voted down the draft law on de-oligarchisation envisaging a ‘personal’ approach in September 2023 and the government adopted a de-oligarchisation action plan in November 2023. The action plan builds on prior Venice Commission recommendations to follow a ‘systemic’ approach, with a focus on the fight against corruption, public procurement, competition policy, justice reform, the fight against money laundering, and the financing of political parties and media. The plan does not provide a regular consultation mechanism with all Parliamentary parties and civil society. The distribution of tasks and timelines remain overly broad. During the reporting period, Georgia adopted amendments to the election code on political party financing, on the Law on fight against corruption and enacted several pieces of primary and implementing legislation on competition policy. Amendments to the tax code adopted in April 2024 by Parliament in expediated procedure allowing for the tax-free transfer of offshore funds to Georgia are not in line with international best practice.
Step 9: Improve the protection of human rights, including by implementing an ambitious human rights strategy and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression. Launch impartial, effective and timely investigations in cases of threats against vulnerable groups, media professionals and civil society activists, and bring organisers and perpetrators of violence to justice. Consult and engage with civil society, allowing for their meaningful involvement in legislative and policymaking processes, and ensure they can operate freely.
The strategy on the protection of human rights 2023-2030 has not been amended to incorporate the recommendations from the 2023 enlargement report. The action plan 2024-2026 for the implementation of the human rights strategy was approved in December 2023 with limited consultation and does not include provisions concerning LGBTIQ people and the protection of privacy. On 17 September 2024, Parliament adopted a legislative package consisting of the Law on family values and protection of minors and eighteen amendments to existing laws without prior public consultations and a thorough analysis of the compliance with European and international standards. On 3 October, the Speaker of the Parliament signed into law the Law on family values and protection of minors, following the President’s refusal to either sign it or veto it. A draft Constitutional Law on protecting family values and minors registered in Parliament by the ruling majority in April 2024 remains pending. The Venice Commission had found the draft constitutional law incompatible with relevant European and international standards and recommended not to proceed with its adoption. As a result of the legislative activities and the continued prevalence of homophobic hate speech, LGBTIQ people in Georgia are facing an increasingly hostile and 25 stigmatising atmosphere. Investigations into the organisation of violence of the 2021 and 2023 Pride events have not been concluded. Georgia continues to implement the national action plan for combating domestic violence and violence against women, but gaps in prevention and response to gender-based violence remain. The legal definition of rape does not fully comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention. The Law on transparency of foreign influence was adopted in May 2024 despite a Venice Commission opinion recommending repealing the law in its entirety. The law undermines the freedom of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs as well as the prohibition of discrimination. Cumbersome reporting requirements and extensive powers given to the Ministry of Justice in controlling civil society and media organisations increase the risk of selective and arbitrary application. There has been an increasing number of acts of intimidation, threats and physical assaults against civil society activists, political leaders and journalists, in particular in the context of the demonstrations against the Law on transparency of foreign influence. Most acts remain to be properly investigated. The Law on transparency of foreign influence is expected to further limit CSO operations and reduce their involvement in legislative and policymaking processes. In addition, as a consequence of the law, CSOs terminated the October 2023 memorandum of cooperation between Parliament and the National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. No progress has been achieved on processes for consultations or contributions for draft laws or policy documents over the reporting period, nor has any progress been achieved on the strategic engagement with civil society.
